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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No- 930156-CA
Priority No, 2

v.
SON T. NGUYEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of receiving stolen
property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1993) and 76-6-412 (1) (b) (i) (1990), in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was there reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle driven by
defendant?
The Utah Supreme Court recently attempted to clarify
the ongoing confusion that has existed over what standard of
review is applicable to a trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion:
11

[A] trial court ['s] determination of whether
a specific set of facts gives rise to

reasonable suspicion is a determination of
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness, as opposed to being a fact
determination reviewable for clear error.
[However,] the reasonable-suspicion legal
standard is one that conveys a measure of
discretion to the trial judge when applying
that standard to a given set of facts.
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say,
but we would not anticipate a close, de novo
review. On the other hand, a sufficiently
careful review is necessary to assure that
the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion
requirement are served."
State v. Pena. No. 930101, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah February 15,
1994) (footnotes omitted).
2.

Was there probable cause to support a warrantless

search of the vehicle driven by defendant under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement?
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial
court's determination of whether probable cause existed is
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, State v. Rocha.
600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (applying clearly erroneous
standard in reviewing trial court's determination that officer
had probable cause to arrest defendant), its discussion of
reasonable suspicion in Pena suggests that it will adopt a
similar stance for probable cause determinations.1
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to suppress statements he made to police and admit
evidence of defendant's confession?

1

Evidentiary rulings are

The issue of whether the Rocha clear error standard is
applicable to warrantless searches is now before the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Pool & Wood, No. 920524.
2

reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however,
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations will be given
deference and reversed only if clearly erroneous.

State v.

Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent
to the resolution of the issues on appeal will be set forth in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an information with one count
of receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1993) and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1990)
(R. 1). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during a
search of the vehicle he was driving, which was denied by the
trial court (R. 107-14).

(Copies of the trial court's order of

denial is attached hereto as Addendum A.

A copy of its findings

of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum
B.).

Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the

lesser included offense of receiving stolen property, a third
degree felony, based on the trial court's determination that
3

defendant was in possession of property valued at more than $250
but not more than $1,000 (R. 113). The trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison, but suspended execution of the sentence and placed
defendant on probation (R. 120-21).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner and
manager of the "Skyview Cafe" in Spanish Fork Canyon, saw a cream
colored Toyota or Datsun automobile pull into the parking lot of
the cafe.

There were at least four Asian individuals in the car.

One of them came into the restaurant and offered to "sell" her
some quarters (R. 139 at 28).

When Barker asked him how many

quarters he had, the individual indicated that he "[t]wo or three
hundred rolls," which Barker understood to mean 200 to 300,
$10.00 rolls of quarters (R. 139 at 25-29).
Barker told the individual that she could not take that
many, but agreed to buy two rolls, or $20 in quarters.

When the

man returned to the car to get the quarters, Barker handed an
order pad to her cook and instructed her to go out the side door
write down the license plate number of the car (R. 139 at 29).
The individual returned with two rolls of quarters.
However, the quarters were not rolled in the customary coin

2

"The facts recited below [a]re taken from the transcript
of the hearing on the motion to suppress, and are recited in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v.
Delanev, 231 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 20 (Utah App. 1994) (citation
omitted). A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum A.
4

sleeves used by banks and businesses.
in yellow notebook paper.

Instead, they were rolled

The individual asked Barker if she

wanted to count them, but Barker unrolled them only partially and
said, "No. That's okay" (R. 139 at 30-1).

According to Barker,

she did not want to detain the individual long because he was
nervous.

As the car left the cafe, Barker looked at the license

plate number and confirmed that it was the same as the number
recorded by her cook.

Because she thought the conduct she had

observed was suspicious, Barker called the Utah County Dispatch
and provided the above information to the police (R. 139 at seal.
Shannon Horn, a dispatcher for the Utah County
Sheriff's office, broadcast an "ATL" (an Attempt to Locate) over
the radio channel used by the local law enforcement.

Her report

conveyed the information then known to dispatch to officers on
duty.

One the officers who heard the ATL, Utah County Deputy

Sheriff David Hill, asked Horn to call the other businesses in
Spanish Fork Canyon to see if they had similar encounters with
the suspects.

Hill also asked Horn to contact Carbon County

officials to see if there had been any recent burglaries or
thefts involving vending machines or reports of individuals
trying to exchange similarly packaged quarters in that area (R.
139 at 36-7, 71).
A Carbon County dispatcher told Horn that they had had
some burglaries of vending machines where quarters had been

5

taken.3

Horn also testified that the proprietors of three other

businesses in the canyon, "The Summit," "Cedar Haven," and "The
Little Acorn," reported that the suspects had attempted to
exchange quarters wrapped in yellow paper for currency.

The

proprietors also indicated that they thought this was suspicious.
Horn ran a check on the license plate, which indicated that it
was registered to an individual with a Vietnamese name.

A

subsequent check of the registered owner's name revealed that his
driver's license was under suspension (R. 139 at 37-8, 70-1).
Horn updated the ATL to include this additional
information as it became available and relayed it to the highway
patrol.

Horn was on duty at the time the vehicle driven by

defendant was stopped, and she testified that it was not stopped
3

The theft in Price involved several Asian males who
entered a 7-11 late at night on October 10, 1992 and began
playing video games. The group left the store at approximately 2
a.m. on October 11. When the 7-11 clerk was cleaning the store
at approximately 7 a.m., she noticed that the lights on one of
the machines were not on. She conducted a cursory examination of
the machine, but did not see anything that looked awry (R. 13 9 at
7-12) .
Two days later, the store manager contacted the vender
who owned the machine to report that it was not working. The
vender instructed the manager to check the coin box to see if the
control panel above it was intact. When the manager did so, she
learned that the lock on the box had been cut and the coin box
and control board removed. The theft had gone undetected because
the lock was put back in place to conceal the fact that the
machine had been tampered with (R. 139 at 12-19).
The manager contacted the Price City Police. An
officer investigated the theft and filed a report that same day
(R. 19-24) .
Although the Carbon County dispatcher told Horn that
Price officials wanted to talk with the individuals in the
suspect vehicle about a recent burglary involving theft of
quarters from a vending machine, it appears she did not provide
Horn the date of the theft or other details of the crime (R. 13 9
at 37, 40).
6

until all of the information she had received was broadcast to
law enforcement personal (R. 139 at 36-9) .
Penny Turner, a Utah Department of Public Safety
Dispatcher, similarly testified that she received an ATL from
Utah County Sheriff's Office and broadcasted the information it
contained to highway patrol officers. According to Turner, all
of the information she received from Utah County dispatch -including the information about the vending machine burglary in
Price -- was relayed to highway patrol officers before the
suspect vehicle was stopped (R. 139 at 42-50).
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Dennis Shields was
patrolling the north end of Utah County on October 27, 1992.
Like other officers in the area, he heard the ATL.

Shortly after

hearing an updated ATL, Shields was told by dispatch that the
suspect vehicle had been located by a department of
transportation worker traveling northbound in American Fork.
Shields overtook the department of transportation vehicle and
began following the car driven by defendant.

The car was tan in

color, there were five oriental males in the car and its license
plate matched that provided by dispatch.

Shields informed

dispatch that he was going to stop the vehicle and was advised
that officers from the American Fork Police Department and Utah
County Sheriff's Office were en route to his location, as were
other highway patrol troopers (R. 139 at 55-61).
As Shields was stopping the suspect vehicle, dispatch
reported that Price City Police wanted to talk to the vehicle
7

occupants about a vending machine burglary in their area (R. 13 9
at 58, 63). Before Shields got out of his car, another officer
arrived at the scene. As Shields approached the driver's side of
the car, the other officer approached the car on the passenger's
side (R. 139 at 59) .
Defendant was driving the car, and Shields told
defendant that he stopped him because of reports that defendant
had attempted to exchange several hundred dollars worth of
quarters at local businesses.

Shields then asked defendant if he

had "any large amounts of quarters wrapped up in yellow paper [,]"
and defendant responded, "[n]o" (R. 139 at 60). When asked if he
had been in Price, defendant told Shields that they were coming
back from Denver, but he denied being in the Price area.

The

officers then decided to have defendant and his four passengers
get out of the car.
driver's license.

Shields requested and received defendant's

He also asked defendant who was the registered

owner of the vehicle, and defendant told him it was "a friend's"
(R. 13 9 at 61). When asked by Shields if he would tell the
officer the name of the registered owner, defendant was unable to
do so.

Instead, defendant again told Shield only that the

vehicle was registered to "a friend" (R. 139 at 60-2).
At that point, Deputy Hill arrived at the scene and
asked the other officers who was driving the vehicle when it was
stopped.

When he was told that defendant was the driver, Hill

escorted defendant back to Hill's truck.

There, Hill again

explained to defendant why he had been stopped (R. 13 9 at 62, 738

4).

Hill also apprised defendant of his rights under Miranda,

and defendant agreed to talk with Hill without an having an
attorney present (R. 139 at 104-05).
Hill asked defendant if he had any coins in the car,
and defendant said he had none.
coins in the car at all?"

Hill reiterated,

Defendant again said,

l!

[t]here are no

fI

[n]o" (R. 139

at 105). When asked where they were coming from, defendant told
Hill that he and his passengers had been visiting a friend in
Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Defendant again said that the car

belonged to a friend and, for the first time, indicated that his
friend's name was "Bo" (R. 139 at 105).
Hill knew, however, that the name of the registered
owner was "completely different," and so he asked defendant for
"Bo's phone number" (R. 139 at 105-06).
didn't know his friend's phone number.

Defendant indicated he
That, coupled with

defendant's failure to provide the correct name of the vehicle's
registered owner, prompted Hill to suspect that the vehicle may
have been stolen (R. 139 at 106).
In the meantime, Shields and some of the other officers
started to search the vehicle.

They opened the trunk and found a

duffel bag containing a large quantity of loose quarters as well
as quarters that were rolled in yellow paper like that described
by Barker and the other proprietors.

There was also a pair of

vice grips sitting on top of the bag.

Just as Hill finished

questioning defendant, one of the other officers took the duffel
bag back to the Hill's truck to show him what they had found (R.
9

13 9 at 106).

Instead of continuing their investigation on the

side of the highway, the officers decided to take defendant and
the other suspects into custody and continue their investigation
at the American Fork Police Station (R. 139 at 112-13, 115). A
search of the vehicle uncovered legal pads with yellow paper,
additional rolls of quarters stowed in white socks, and a pillow
case containing bolt cutters4 and screwdrivers (R. 13 9 at 10709, 113-15).
counted.

The quarters were taken to a nearby bank to be

The total value of the quarters was $2,096.75 (R. 13 9

at 111).
At the American Fork Police Station, Deputy Scott
Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's office met with defendant for
the first time.

Carter was told by other officers that defendant

had been apprised of his rights under Miranda, and he confirmed
that defendant was aware of those rights and asked defendant if
he was willing to answer questions.

Defendant indicated his

willingness to do so, and Carter taped the ensuing interrogation
(R. 139 at 122-24).
Defendant admitted that he and his friends had taken
the quarters from some video machines at 7-11 stores located in
Colorado.

Defendant explained that he and four juveniles

typically entered the targeted 7-11 and played the video games
4

The bolt cutters and the lock that was on the video
machine at the 7-11 in Price were analyzed by the state crime
lab. It was stipulated that the investigators at the lab would
have testified that the lock was not cut by those bolt cutters
(R. 139 at 52). However, because defendant was charged only with
receiving stolen property and not charged with burglary, that
finding is of little import.
10

until the store clerk felt comfortable with them.

Eventually,

the five would break into the machine, steal the coin box, and
depart (R. 13 9 at 126). Defendant indicated that they had done
this at two 7-11 stores in the Colorado Springs area and at two
other stores, the locations of which were unclear.

Although

defendant admitted that the quarters found in the vehicle were
the spoils of those burglaries, he was unable to discern how much
money was taken from each establishment (R. 139 at 125-27).
Carter interrogated defendant again at the county jail
two days later.

Defendant was verbally apprised of his Miranda

rights, and Carter provided defendant a voluntary statement form
that included a written statement of those rights.

On that form,

defendant executed a signed, handwritten statement indicating
that the quarters were stolen in burglaries of four 7-11 stores
located in Colorado (R. 138, exhibit #11).

During the course of

that interrogation, defendant provided a more detailed
explanation of how he and his cohorts broke into the video
machines using the bolt cutters, screwdrivers and vice grips
found in the vehicle.

He contended, however, that he was

primarily a lookout and driver.

Defendant also denied

burglarizing the video machine at the 7-11 store located in Price
(R. 139 at 129-34).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress.

The stop of the vehicle driven by defendant was

supported by reasonable suspicion of theft of quarters from
11

vending machines, and the scope of the ensuing detention was
strictly tied to investigation into that suspicion.

Upon

stopping the vehicle, the investigating officer's obtained
sufficient information to establish the probable cause necessary
to justify searching the vehicle under the automobile exception
rule.

Finally, there was other competent evidence aside from

defendant's confession to police that justified admission of that
confession under the corpus delicti rule. Accordingly, this
Court should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress, and affirm defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER BECAUSE IT WAS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.
The trial court properly determined that the "initial
stop of the vehicle being driven by the Defendant was lawful
[because it was] based upon reasonable suspicion that the
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video
[machine] burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of
the car [had] evidence which [sic] may have been relevant to the
Price investigation" (R. 108). As demonstrated below, the facts
known to Trooper Shields at the time he made the stop easily
satisfy the minimal objective justification standard for
establishing reasonable suspicion.

This Court should therefore

uphold the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion.

12

A.

The Standard for Proving Reasonable Suspicion
is Considerably Less Than a Preponderance of
the Evidence*
The reasonable suspicion test for making an

investigative stop is well-known: "where an officer observes
unusual conduct which reasonably leads him to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot" a brief
investigative stop and detention to dispel the officer's
suspicion or prevent criminal activity is justified.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 30 (1968) (emphasis added).

Terry v.

As the term

"may" implies, an officer's on-the-spot determination of whether
there is reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop
requires a weighing of probabilities:
"The process does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common-sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders
are permitted to do the same -- and so are
law enforcement officers."
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585
(1989) (quoting United State v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)).
That is not to say that officers have unbridled
discretion to stop and detain citizens without being able to
articulate some basis for doing so:
The officer, of course, must be able to
articulate something more than an inchoate
and unparticularlized suspicion or hunch.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
13

It is clear, however, that the standard for
establishing reasonable suspicion is a low threshold of proof:
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal
objective justification" for making the stop.
That level of suspicion is considerably less
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance
of the evidence. We have held that probable
cause means "a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found," and the level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding
than probable cause . . . .
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and some
internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

Accord

Terrv, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
Shortly after Sokolow was decided, the Utah Supreme
Court similarly recognized that the standard of proof needed to
establish reasonable suspicion was less than that needed for
probable cause.

In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the

defendant, suspected of robbery, was stopped and questioned by an
officer.

Significantly, the defendant argued that his initial

detention was unsupported by probable cause.

Id. at 650. The

Supreme Court, however, relying upon Terry and its own post-Terry
case law, upheld the stop on the less strict, reasonable
suspicion standard:

"We have held that a brief investigatory

stop of an individual by police officers is permissible when the
officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts,
that the individual is involved in criminal activity."

Bruce,

779 P.2d at 650 (quoting authorities; internal quotations
omitted).
In the wake of Sokolow and Bruce, this Court also
14

recognized that reasonable suspicion requires only a minimal
level of certainty by stating, in State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
541 (Utah App. 1990), that reasonable suspicion "must be based on

objective

facts

suggesting

that the individual

mav be involved

in

criminal activity" (emphasis added) . Bruce and Menlce comport
with the fourth amendment's "minimal objective justification"
standard for establishing reasonable suspicion, set fourth in
Sokolow.
The Sokolow standard for establishing reasonable
suspicion recognizes that limited, non-arrest detentions serve
not merely to apprehend criminals, but also to disp^]_ suspicion
and prevent, criminal activity.

E.g. . Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88

S. Ct. at 1880 (limited detentions supported by interest in
"effective crime prevention and detection").

That definition

contemplates the very real likelihood that many such detentions
will reveal no criminal evidence.

That likelihood, however, does

not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment
in question, would warrant a person of "reasonable Caution" in
taking action.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

In evaluating the validity of an investigative stop or
detention, a court must consider "'the totality of the
circumstances -- the whole picture.'"

Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8,

109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1981)).

See also

(Utah App. 1992).

State v. Stricklincr. 844 P.2d 979, 983

Accordingly, "dissecting the facts that

confronted [the officer]" and [l]ooking at each fact in isolation
15

. . . is not proper."

Stricklincr. 844 P.2d at 983.

There may also have been wholly innocent explanations
and alternative inferences to be drawn from every one of the
factors confronting the officer.

That, however, has never been a

proper basis for ruling that an investigative detention was
invalid:
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100
S. Ct. 2752, [] (1980) (per curiam), "there
could, of course, be circumstances in which
wholly lawful conduct might justify the
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot."
. . . Indeed, Terry IV. Ohio] itself involved
"a series of acts, each of them perhaps
innocent" if viewed separately, "but which
taken together warranted further
investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct.,
at 1881.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87.
Utah courts also have recognized that potentially
innocent behavior may nonetheless give rise to reasonable
suspicion.

In State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App.

1992), the defendant argued that 'all of the factors justifying
reasonable suspicion listed by the [officer] [we]re consistent
with innocent behavior and thus, [could not] amount to reasonable
suspicion."

This Court rejected that argument and held that

ft

[t]he trial court's findings of fact show that a reasonable

person would conclude that Chapman had violated the [law]."

Id.

at 728 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Menke, this Court correctly held that the
behavior of an individual outside a shopping mall, "although
conceivably consistent with innocent--albeit highly eccentric-16

activity," were nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting.
787 P.2d at 541. Therefore, the detention of that individual by
the observing officers was deemed reasonable.

Id.

This Court

recently reiterated its adherence to Menke in Provo Citv v.
Spotts, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah App. 1993).
In Spotts, as in Chapman, the defendant argued that
"prior to the stop, [the officer] observed no activity
inconsistent with innocent behavior" and that the officer
therefore lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Id.

at 32. The Spotts court easily rejected that claim and reviewed
all of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
stop before concluding that "although defendant's activity was
conceivably consistent with innocent behavior, it was strongly
indicative of criminal activity[.]"

Id. at 33. The court

therefore upheld the trial court's finding of reasonable
suspicion.

Id.
In this case, while it is true that there may have been

some innocent explanation for defendant's unusual activity, his
conduct was nevertheless suspicious.

The facts that support the

trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion are discussed below
in subsection B.
B#

Law Enforcement Personnel had Sufficient
Facts to Justify Making An Investigative Stop
of Defendant's Vehicle,
Shields stopped defendant's vehicle based on the

Attempt to Locate Order ("ATL") issued by police dispatch.

17

Under

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989):
[I]f a flyer or bulletin has been issued on
the basis of articulable facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion that the wanted person
has committed an offense, then reliance on
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to
check identification, to pose questions to
the person, or to detain the person briefly
while attempting to obtain further
information. If the flyer [or bulletin] has
been issued in the absence of a reasonable
suspicion, then a stop in the objective
reliance upon it violates the Fourth
Amendment.
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650 (quoting United States v. Henslev, 469
U.S. 221, 232-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682

(1985)).

See also State v.

Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Bruce for
proposition that a police dispatch supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity may be relied upon by police
officers in stopping a vehicle and making further investigation).
Accordingly, the precise issue to be addressed is whether the ATL
issued by police dispatch was supported by a "minimal objective
justification" giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

Roth, 827 P.2d at 257.

It clearly was.

By the time the vehicle driven by defendant was
stopped, the ATL was supported by several pieces of information
that, considered collectively, easily satisfy the minimal
objective justification standard for establishing reasonable
suspicion.

First, dispatch had been told the vehicle was either

light tan, cream or white in color and that it was a foreign car
-- either a Toyota or a Datsun.
was a tan Toyota.

The vehicle driven by defendant

Second, dispatch had an accurate license plate
18

number as provided by Barker that matched the license plate
number on defendant's vehicle.

Third, dispatch knew the race and

gender of the vehicle's four or five occupants.

Fourth, dispatch

knew not only the vehicle's location, but also its path through
the canyon based on its stops at various businesses and the
observation of the UDOT worker who reported that the car was
traveling northbound near American Fork.

These factors all

support the identification of the vehicle driven by defendant as
the "suspect vehicle."

Cf. Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (noting that

the dispatcher in that case provided the make, color, location
and license plate of the stopped vehicle as well as a "gender
description" of the "drunk driver").
On the issue of whether the conduct of defendant and
his cohorts was sufficiently suspicious to warrant investigation,
the most compelling information was that provided by ordinary
citizens.5

For instance, Barker reported that defendant entered

her cafe and attempted to exchange "two to three hundred" rolls
of quarters.

Defendant's youth, nervous behavior and possession

of $2,000 to $3,000 was so suspicious to Barker that she directed

5

Information obtained from ordinary citizens is generally
presumed to be reliable. See, e.g.. State v. Purser. 828 P.2d
515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) ("[R]eliability and veracity are
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from police in exchange for the information.") (citations
omitted). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §
3.4(a) at 712-23 (1987). Unlike a police informant who is from
the criminal milieu, ordinary citizens typically have no interest
in reporting suspected criminal activity beyond the desire "to
aid the police in law enforcement because of [their] concern for
society or for [their] own safety. [They do] not expect any gain
or concession in exchange for [their] information." Id. at 716.
19

her cook to record the license plate number of the car driven by
defendant.

When defendant returned to the cafe and gave Barker

two rolls of quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper instead of
standard coin sleeves, Barker's suspicion was further heightened.
Barker was not the only citizen to report such
suspicions to the police.

Personnel at three other businesses

reported similar encounters to police within a very short period
of time.

Like Barker, the other proprietors considered the use

of yellow notebook paper to roll the large quantity of quarters
offered to them by defendant suspicious.
In sum, ordinary citizens at four businesses acting
independently of each other reported their concerns about their
encounters with defendant and his cohorts. While attempts by
four to five youths to exchange thousands of dollars worth of
quarters for currency may well be commonplace in such slot
machine hotbeds as Las Vegas or Atlantic City, the citizens of
Spanish Fork Canyon clearly thought such conduct was suspicious
for their neck-of-the-woods.

Dispatch knew, however, the each

encounter was not merely an isolated incident.

Rather, it was

clear that defendant and his colleagues were attempting to
exchange quarters wrapped in yellow paper at each business
establishment as they traveled through the canyon.
Defendant's response to this evidence is simply that it
is neither illegal to accumulate quarters nor improper to roll
them in yellow notebook paper instead of coin sleeves. While
true, defendant's assertion is irrelevant.
20
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investigative detention was therefore justified.
Oth*

-bvt- similarly recognized that attempts to

exchange coins for currency may, depending upon the
circumstances, give rise to reasonable suspicion to support an
i nvesMqat/p »e nt p and even probable cause to arrest,

S ee. e r

, eopie v. Evans. J2

State v. Sell, 4 96 * *.,

Ill.App.3d 865, 336 N.E.2d 792 (1975); People v. Beard. 35
]

,

-:a J4J,

(1976); State v . Maxie, 377 P. 2d

435 (Wash. 1962).6
In Sell, a police officer was told by the owner of a
local camera store that "three 'unkempt boys' who were strangers
in the town had just been in his store trying to sell some
coins."

Sell, 496 P.2d at 45. The officer soon observed the

three boys walking down the street in the area of the camera
store.

They were the only three boys the officer had seen

together that were strangers. After picking up another officer,
he circled around the block and saw the three boys get into a
car.

The officers followed the car and clocked it traveling at

30 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. At that juncture, the officers
stopped the trio "for speeding . . . [and because] three youths
trying to sell some coins in the City of Winnemucca" was
suspicious.

Id.

Based on the facts presented, the Sell court held that
there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and that it
was
[im]material whether the defendant's car was
initially stopped by police because of the
speeding violation or simply for purposes of
momentary on-the-street detention to
determine the identity of the defendant and
his passengers. In either case, the police
acted justifiably.
Id. at 50.
In this case, the totality of the circumstances known

6

Because Evans, Beard and Maxie involve findings of
probable cause, they are discussed under Point II of this brief,
which addresses the question of whether the search of defendant's
vehicle was supported by probable cause.
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The stop in this case was not for a routine traffic
violation.

Rather, it was based on an ATL for investigation of

theft, and the scope of detention issue is therefore controlled
by Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650. Here, the officers checked
defendant's identification and detained him only "briefly while
attempting to gather additional information" about the quarters
defendant was trying to -exchange for currency at local
businesses.

That is precisely what the officers should have done

under Bruce.

Because defendant provided false and unsatisfactory

answers to police questions, his continued detention was
justified.

Indeed, as demonstrated in Point II below, the

additional information obtained by the officers after defendant
was stopped elevated the level of suspicion beyond reasonable
suspicion to probable cause.
POINT II
THE FACTS KNOWN TO THE INVESTIGATING OFFICERS
JUSTIFIED A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE
UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The trial court's determination that the warrantless
search of the vehicle driven by defendant was proper under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement first articulated
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925), should
be upheld.
The Carroll Court determined that a warrantless search
of an automobile was permissible if the searching officers "have
probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if
24
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Defendant does not, however, advance a distinct claim
under the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, this Court should
limit its analysis to that called for under the fourth amendment.
See, State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 n.l (Utah 1987); State v.
'Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 821 n.l (Utah Ct, App. 1993) (both holding
that where a defendant relies on the fourth amendment and
advances no claim under the state constitution, appellate court
will not engage j n a separate state constitutional analysis).

the issue of probable cause.
A.

The Investigating Officers Had
Probable Cause to Believe the
Vehicle contained Quarters that
Were Stolen From Vending Machines,

The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme
Court have defined probable cause for a vehicle search as "a
belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1087-88 (citations omitted).

This probable

cause assessment is made "from the objective standpoint of a
'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer . . . guided by his
experience and training.'"

Id. (quoting United States v. Davis,

458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
Although the test for establishing probable cause may
at first blush appear exacting, it in fact requires a common
sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances confronting
the officer at the time of the search:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations
of every day life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved.
Dorsev. 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brineaar. 388 U.S. at 175, 69
S.Ct. at 1310.).
certainty,

Because probable cause does not require

,f

[t]he line between 'mere suspicion and probable cause

. . . necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in
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the light of the particular situation and with account taken of
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This Court has

similarly indicated that probable cause requires "'only the
probaj:-activity

Morck, 821 i .. : :.r
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(quoting State v. Brown, 798
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suspicion" that the vehicle driven by defendant contained
evidence of a crime.

As flip trial court implicit •• recognized in

denying defendant u mini n in in Aiypi esb, Llii1 i

.

the officers at the time of the search would have prompted a
"prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer" 1
there was a "substantial chance

conclude that

vehicle contained evidence

relevant to a burglary or theft of coins.

That ruling should be

upheld.
As indicated in Point I, other courts addressing
circumstances similar to those presented in this case have held
that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant or
search the area in question.8
In Beard, for instance, police dispatch issued a
bulletin indicating that two black men in a "black-over-red
Cadillac with a given license number" had "attempted to exchange
some silver coins for currency at a liquor store [.]"

Beard. 342

N.E.2d at 344. The report was later updated after it was learned
that the two had stopped at another location and again tried to
exchange silver coins for currency.
officer learned that a

,f

In the meantime, another

considerable quantity of silver coins had

been taken in [aj burglary."

Beard, 342 N.E.2d at 344. Having

8

As Professor LaFave explains in his treatise on search and
seizure, ,f[i]t is generally assumed by the Supreme Court and
lower courts that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or
probable cause to search. For this reason, discussions by courts
of the probable cause requirement often refer to and rely upon
prior decisions without regard to whether these earlier cases
were concerned with the grounds to arrest or the grounds to
search." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.1(b), at 544
(1987) (footnote omitted). LaFave summarizes the difference
between what must be shown in each context:
"In the case of
arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee,
whereas in the case of search[es,] the conclusions go to the
connection of the items sought with crime and to their present
location." Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
With this distinction in mind, the State will rely on
cases involving probably cause to arrest insofar as they help to
demonstrate that there was a "substantial chance" that the
quarters reportedly in defendant's possession were connected with
criminal activity.
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In . similar case, the Washington Supreme Court upheld
the arrest of ^he aerenaan.
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A police officer in a small town learned, at
1:45 a.m., that a cafe in the community had
just been broken into and that the loot
included a quantity of Canadian coins; and,
then, a short time later when he learned from
a waitress in an all-night cafe that a
stranger, whom she pointed out, had just
requested her to give him dollar bills for
coins (mostly Canadian), which she had done,
he questioned the stranger and, believing
that he had committed the burglary, arrested
him.
State v. Maxie. ^nn

<-

-

-

the c.jurt opined that "had the officer failed *
V-"-- • '••••-*
duty."

"' - n:-lumen,
. .<e ar. arrest

imstances, he would have been derelict in his

IsL. at 438.
Although the coins involved in both Maxie and Beard

5

__ should be noted that, although the Beard court cited
Terry in its opinion, it did not characterize the stop of Beard
and his codefendant as an investigative Terry stop requiring only
reasonable suspicion. Instead, the court deemed the stop an
"arrest" requiring a showing of probable cause. Beard, **49
N.E.2d at 346-47.
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were arguably more distinctive than those involved in this case,
the important similarity between the three cases is that the
investigating officers knew that the coins in question were the
same type as those that had recently been stolen in nearby
burglaries.

(In contrast, had defendant attempted to exchange a

large quantity of dimes, then the fact that there had been a
recent theft involving quarters would obviously be less
significant.)
Yet another case, Evans, 336 N.E.2d 792, illustrates
how a general report of criminal activity in a particular area
can be combined with recently observed suspicious activity
reported by an ordinary citizen to establish probable cause.
About a week after she had read newspaper accounts warning that
people had been "selling fraudulent rolls of coins, with a
quarter at each end and washers in between, to grocery stores in
the area," a woman leaving a grocery store saw two men in the car
parked next to her car.

Evans, 336 N.E.2d at 793. As she opened

her door, the woman watched to make sure that it did not hit the
other car.

In so doing, she noticed the man in the passenger

seat doing something with his hands and saw "quite a few
different colored coin wrappers inside the open glove
compartment.

The passenger looked up at her and quickly closed

the glove compartment."

Id.

Suspicious, the woman wrote down

the license plate number and later called police to report what
she had seen.

Id.

Police dispatch issued a bulletin on the suspects about
30

an hour after receiving the citizen report:
c
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n Evans considered
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important for purposes of establishing probable cause, the fact
that defendant provided obviously false and evasive answers to
police inquires helped I11 "i-' r»Ki IBJI luuljdlil!
See Menke, 787 P.2d at 54:
defendant's false c»
conjunction with hig

(19751
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Courts and commentators agree that a

determine the existence of probable cause
United States v

1 aubt

f—
.
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i) I

m M | in

See generally
2585, 2589

quest.

considered in evaluating whether a subsequent warrantless search
was supported by probable cause).
As Professor LaFave explains:
Just as a satisfactory explanation of
circumstances previously appearing suspicious
to the [investigating] officer will likely
necessitate the conclusion that those
suspicions do not then amount to probable
cause, responses by the suspect [that] the
officer knows -to be false, or which are
implausible, conflicting, evasive or
unresponsive may well constitute probable
cause when considered together with the prior
suspicions.
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.6(f) at 65-66 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
One common situation in which unsatisfactory responses
to police questions may elevate the prior suspicions to the level
of probable is that in which the questioning is prompted by
suspicious possession of certain property.

Id.

As explained

above, under the unusual circumstances known at the time of the
initial stop, defendant's possession of quarters appeared highly
suspicious.

Although defendant now postulates about the possible

"innocent explanations" for his eccentric behavior, at the time
of the stop, he offered no such explanations for his conduct.
As this Court recognized in Menke:
It is not too much to expect that if a
legitimate reason existed for this suspicious
behavior, one with innocent purpose would
hasten to offer it. But when appellant
elected not to do so, and instead gave the
[false] response that he did, that fact may
-- and here we hold did -- tip the scales in
favor of probable cause to believe that
appellant had been attempting to [commit the
crime].
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Menke, 787 P.2d at 542 (quot ing Arrington v. United States, 311
A, 2d B JB , Li'Il ! Il i 2

I! £ \ 3) )

In this case, defendant was evasive when asked for the
name of the vehiclr'£* registered owner

Taylor v.

Commonwe a11h, _
(fact that both occupants of stopped truck professed to have no
operators license and no : identification added *- -"inding
probable cause to search).

More i m p 0 r tan

>-..; .-iiil:

hasten to offer an innocent explanation for

s suspicious

He i nstead falsely denied hav-'~.~ Quarters :* >-" s car.

conduct

Shields and the other officers knew : . . .,
assertion that there were no quarters in the car was untruthful
because I hey Iin :! reports from four different businesses
indicating that defendant had attempted to exchange hundreds of
dollars worth :+ quarters t. .. currency.
s**

'- •

*

Defendant's false denial

:readv —

T J suspicions that

the vehicle contained evidence „. i w ..rime and elevatec
level of probable cause.

. : .: : he

See generally Menke, 787 P.2d at: 543.

See also State * Busbv , 6 5 6 S \ 1 2 i 8 2 0 , IE!22 (M< >
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apparent falsehood" helped establish probable cause where
officers knew that the defendant had been seen with murder victim
a I

I lh

I ni il

i l l nii'H"' I ni i mi i

Il ill I In1 defender-

not seen the victim on i ^ .*« .
Reynolds. 619 S.W.2d ^ :

*- ^

1 aimed t h a t

li •• h a d

-as murdered); State v.
1981) (the defendant's

i

whereabouts and activities w.. ine day of LI-- homicide"

contributed to finding of probable cause); Taylor, 284 S.E.2d at
836-37 (court rejected the defendant's claim that there was
"nothing connecting the fact that [his truck] was [heavily]
loaded to the fact that it was loaded with contraband as opposed
to furniture or other legal material" in part because "[t]he
occupants maintained that the vehicle was empty; yet it obviously
was loaded").
Under the totality of the circumstances, reports from
four different businesses that defendant had attempted to
exchange hundreds of dollars worth of quarters for currency, the
fact that the quarters were wrapped in yellow notebook instead of
commonly used coin sleeves, the report of a recent burglary in
Price involving the theft of a large quantity of quarters, and
defendant' s obviously false and evasive responses to police
questions would prompt a "prudent, reasonable, cautious police
officer" to conclude that there was a "substantial chance" the
vehicle contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of
coins.

Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the

search was supported by probable cause is amply supported by the
record.

This Court should therefore affirm the court's denial of

defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT III
THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH CORPUS DELICTI INDEPENDENT OF
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION. EVIDENCE OF THAT
CONFESSION WAS THEREFORE PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Evidence of defendant's confession to police was
properly admitted at trial.

It is well settled that "before a
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In this context, the term "corpus delicti" involves the
question of whether there was sufficient proof that a crime was
committed to allow the introduction of defendant's confession at
trial. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 n.8 (discussing distinction
between corpus delicti for purposes of allowing introduction of a
confession and corpus delicti as a t relates to evidence that
defendant committed the crime).
11
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described how the thefts at various 7-11 stores had been
executed, defendant confessed to criminal conduct that was
strikingly similar to the Price burglary.

Second, over $2,000 in

quarters were found in defendant's possession.

Finally, the

burglary tools found in defendant's car -- bolt cutters, vice
grips and screw drivers -- were the same type of tools used in
the Price break in and were consistent with the burglary tools
that defendant claimed he and his band of minions used to break
into video machines.
The independent evidence presented below not only
established corpus delicti, it also dispelled any concern that
defendant gave a false confession.

Defendant's inculpatory

statements were therefore properly admitted by the trial
court.12

12

Defendant also challenges admission of evidence
concerning the burglary in Price on the grounds that it ran afoul
of Utah R. Evid. 401 & 404(b). Defendant's claim is without
merit because the evidence was admitted solely for purposes of
establishing corpus delicti (R. 139 at 53-4). It was clearly
relevant to that issue because it tended to show that a crime had
been committed, which is a prerequisite for admission of
defendant's post-crime inculpatory statement under Utah's corpus
delicti rule. See Point III of this brief.
As for defendant's 404(b) challenge, that issue was not
raised below, and defendant argues no basis for reaching the
issue despite his failure to raise it below. His claim is
therefore waived on appeal. State v. Smith, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(Utah 1993) ("It is black-letter law that an appellate court will
not address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in
extraordinary circumstances[.]"). In any event, rule 404(b) has
no bearing on this issue because testimony concerning the Price
burglary was never presented as evidence of a prior bad act
attributable to defendant. Rather, as stated above, it was
admitted for the much narrower purpose of establishing corpus
delicti to justify admission of defendant's post-crime admissions
to police.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial cour* - denial of defendant's motion L.^
suppress, and affn.. ,ierendantf~ conviction,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QjL^

day of February,

II 9:94. •
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

s
Plaintiff,

s

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

SON T. NGUYEN,
Defendant(s)

t

Case No. 921400546 FS

•
•

Judge Guy R. Burningham

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R.
Burningham presiding on the 20th day of January, 1993.

The

Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve
Hatch.

The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County

Attorney, James R. Taylor. The matter was tried to the bench and
the Court considered the Defendant's various Motions in Limine and
to Suppress Evidence.

The Court being fully advised in the

premises does hereby make and enter the following:

rrapjwss QF PACT
1. On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner/manager of
a restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon observed a small car described
as a Datsun or Toyota, cream or tan in color, occupied by five
Asian individuals as it pulled up to her restaurant.

One of the

individuals came in and offered to sell her quarters. He indicated
that he had two to three hundred rolls of quarters. Mrs. Barker
purchased a couple of rolls which were wrapped in yellow notebook

paper and obtained the license number of the Toyota car as it drove
away.

Shortly after the individuals left Mrs. Barker went to a

telephone and called Utah County Dispatch and provided all of this
information.
2.

Utah County Dispatchers

in cooperation with patrol

officers determined that shortly after the incident with Mrs.
Barker additional attempts to sell quarters were made at two more
businesses west of the first restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon.
3.

Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that Price

Police were investigating a recent burglary and theft involving
large numbers of quarters from a video arcade machine.
4.

Dispatchers ran a computer check on the license number

provided and determined that the registered owner of the vehicle
had a Vietnamese name and had a suspended driver's license.
5.

Dispatchers broadcast an "ATL" (attempt to locate) to

patrol officers including the Utah County Sheriff and local police
departments and contacted Highway Patrol dispatch.
6. The information was dispatched to Highway Patrol officers
and Department of Transportation vehicles.
7.

Shortly thereafter a small Toyota with the same license

plate number occupied by four Asian individuals was observed
northbound on Interstate 15. Highway Patrol troopers and other law
enforcement agencies responded and the vehicle was stopped just
west of American Fork on Interstate 15.
8. A Utah Highway Patrol trooper approached the car and spoke
with the driver who was the Defendant, Son t. Nguyen.

The

2

*i

Defendant denied having any quarters in the car or any knowledge of
any incident in Price or Spanish Fork Canyon.
9.

The Defendant was not the registered owner of the car.

Although he stated that the registered owner was a friend he was
unable to give a full name, address, or phone number.
10.

Officers

opened

the

trunk

of

the

automobile

and

discovered a bag containing a large number of quarters, some
wrapped in yellow notebook paper. Officers also found bolt cutters
and tools in a separate bag in the trunk and additional rolls of
quarters in the passenger compartment of the car.
11. The Defendant was advised of his miranda rights, which he
waived,

and

conversed

with

Deputy

Dave

Hill

at

the

scene

demonstrating an ability to speak and understand the English
language.
12. The quarters were taken into evidence and counted when it
was determined that there was a total of $2,096.75 in quarters.
13.

The

Defendant

was

taken

to American

Fork

Police

Department where he was again advised of his miranda rights and
questioned by Detective Scott Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's
Office after indicating that he was willing to waive his rights and
speak without an attorney.
14.

The Defendant admitted to Detective Carter that he had

been in Colorado with his friends and that they had burglarized
several 7-11 stores.

The Defendant stated that the quarters had

been taken from video arcade games in the 7-11 stores.

The

Defendant stated that he thought there were approximately $550.00
3

worth of quarters.
15. The Defendant was again interviewed several days later by
Detective Carter.

The Defendant executed a written waiver of his

miranda rights and wrote and signed a confession which was accepted
into evidence.
16.

The written statement of the Defendant was as follows:

They borrow the car let drove it to Co. Spring 2 7eleven
when we frist got in to C.S. then we rent a motel 2
nights and after that we hit 4 more 7eleven then we drove
to denver to eat and then drove home. We took quarters
from the machine. I was with Monk, long, nam, nam.
During the same interview the Defendant described to Detective
Carter in detail how the burglaries would be performed.

He stated

that a group of individuals, all oriental, would go into the stores
which were always 7-ll#s.

They would play the video machines for

a period of time until the clerk was no longer interested.

They

would then cut off the lock and completely remove the box for
catching coins and simply walk out of the store with the stolen
quarters and equipment.
16. On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglarized. At
approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental individuals entered the
store

and

began

playing

video

approximately forty minutes.

games

which

they

did

for

The individuals then left and the

clerk didn't notice anything wrong with the video machine. At the
beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the video machine
was blank and not operating.

The owner checked the machine and

discovered that the lock to the coin box had been cut, the door to
the coin collection box pried opened and the coin box removed. The

4

Price City Police were called to the 7-11/and an official report
was taken and an investigation started*
17. It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized in the car
the Defendant was driving was excluded as having cut the lock on
the 7-11 in Price•
18.

The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on or

about October 27# 1992, in Utah County the Defendant retained the
property of another person knowing the property had been stolen or
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to
deprive the owner of the property and the property was cash or
coins with the value of more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and
enters the following:

CQNcmg?QNs of SAW
1.

The initial stop of the automobile being driven by the

Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable suspicion that the
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video
burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of the car
contained evidence which may have been relevant to the Price
investigation.
2. The detention of the Defendant and the other passengers of
the car did not exceed the scope of the initial stop.
3.

The warrantless search of the automobile was based upon

probable cause and exigent circumstances.

More specifically, a

reasonable person in viewing the evidence available to the officers
could have concluded that it was likely that the automobile

5

contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins in the
Price area.

Inasmuch as the potential

evidence was

in an

automobile traveling away from the suspected crime and the best
information available indicated that the occupants were in the
midst of actively disposing of potential evidence, there were
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search*
4.

Although the evidence independent of the Defendant's

confession by itself does not establish the corpus delicti of the
crime charged when considered together with the confession the
Court believes that there is substantial separate evidence of the
corpus delicti such that reasonable minds could believe that the
crime was a real one which was in fact committed and not one which
was fanciful or imaginary.
5. The Defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made
following an appropriate waiver of his rights to counsel as
required by Miranda.
6. The Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of
Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree felony.
DATED this

/£

day of ffauudiyyi993 *
BY THE COURT:
C
I******

GtfiHR. SURNINGHAM
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CLEVE HATCH
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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